### 1AC – Refusal v1

#### Antitrust laws forge a narrative that monopolization is a process confined to the bounds of the market. The resolutional requirement of increasing prohibitions on “anticompetitive business practices by the private sector” intrinsically restricts queer people’s ability to discuss the nature of violence against them – it has predetermined that the legitimate avenue for remedying violence resides in legal fights with corporations with one goal: promote competition. But it is the doctrine of competition that makes queerness fungible – the generative nature of queerness becomes flattened in order to maximize market potential.

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‘When neoliberalism takes root as a social ontology, this economic calculation of end less self-enhancement becomes the primary mode of self-reflection and, in Foucault's terms of pleasures’ relation to freedom and truth, we begin to see the ethical bankruptcy of neo- liberalism. When the social rationality of neoliberalism transforms the subject into an endlessly self-enhancing circuit of interests, the notion of “freedom” is severed from any concern with the other—much less, the Other—as a meaningful site of relationality. Turned ‘wholly towards the pleasure of maximizing one’s interests, the neoliberal subject only registers a concern with others who are “outside” of oneself insofar as they present opportunities or obstacles to that endless self-enhancement. While this kind of socially cultivated and encouraged solipsism already endangers the possibility of ethics as a meaningful relation to others, a further look at the mechanisms of that economic calculation shows that the neoliberal self-enhancing enterprise of non teleological pleasures turns on the erasure of difference itself. For post-Hegelian understandings of ethics, this erasure of difference en- tails the erasure of the very possibility of ethics.

‘The kind of calculation that Foucault locates in the neoliberal theorists is purely formal. That is, we neoliberal selves begin to determine all social values through the singular barometer of that economic calculation: fungibility. To be fungible is to have all character and content hollowed-out. It is a relationship of equity that requires purely formal semblance. In economic terms, fungibility refers to those goods and products on the market that are substitutable for one another. For example, a bushel of wheat from Nebraska is, fungible with a bushel of wheat from lowa, assuming the quality and grade of wheat is the same. Fungibility undergirds the monetary system, since it is the formal quality of bank rotes that allows them to be fully substitutable: the $5 bill in my wallet is the same as the ‘one in your wallet. This is different from exchangeable goods, which must be related to a ‘common standard (such as money) in order to judge their differing or similar values.

While this may all make sense at the level of economics, the problematic neoliberal twist is translating it from a dynamic of capital to a dynamic of “human capital:” this is the ‘crucial site at which neoliberalism becomes ethically bankrupt. As the extensive work on the globalized disparities of wealth and poverty shows, the fungibility of human capital is rendering human labor precarious. Just as factory-workers in the Industrial Revolution were expendable, so too has a great deal of contemporary labor become formally inter- ‘changeable: assembling technological gadgets can happen here or there (or, in the veiled nationalist language of the market, “here or offshore”); but increasingly, so can more highly specialized activities, such as medical diagnoses, engineering solutions, and even market analyses. As the work of Aihwa Ong shows, the fungibility of human labor at all stratifications of socio-economic class—from factories in Malaysia and Indonesia to “cyber heroes” of Silicon Valley—is quickly rendering all human labor both migrant and precarious. Even the human voice is on its way to fungibility, as the training of telemarketers in Mum- bai to mimic the “flat accent” of the Midwestern American renders their human capital fully fungible with any other “unaccented” voice in the US.

‘This move towards fungibility, away from exchangeability, as the market’s barometer transforms the category of social difference in significant and startling ways. When the market outstrips the contract in neoliberalism, the truths produced by the market must be constantly and actively reproduced, over and over. Foucault emphasizes that, in the distancing from both Adam Smith and Marx neoliberals do not claim that competition is a natural human state; rather, it is constantly stimulated by the activity of the market as the site of veridiction In order to achieve this constant stimulation of competition, the neo- liberals (especially the ordoliberals in Germany) focus on “the formal properties of the competitive structure that assured, and could assure, economic regulation through the price ‘mechanism.” As McWhorter notes in her essay in this collection, Foucault specifies: “competition is a principle of formalization.” Arguing explicitly against a welfare economy, the ‘ordoliberals insisted that the fundamental objective of such policies to create and sustain the equalization of consumption across society was, actually, the death of economic growth, ‘They argue that this crucial price mechanism, which generates the truths of the market, ‘must “not [be] obtained through phenomena of equalization but through a game of differentiations.”\* Inequality is essential to stimulating market competition and, as such, experienced by all members of the society. It is not that from which government ought to protect us. To the contrary, if the neoliberal aim of rendering the market the site of veridiction—across all aspects of society —is to be achieved, then inequality must be intensified and multiplied until the social fabric becomes a conglomeration of diffuse, fungible differences.

Difference is thus not so much commodified, as bell hooks’ analysis from the 1990s argues; nor is it simply to be erased in the name of globalized homogeneity, as early critics ‘of neoliberalism have argued. Rather, difference must be intensified, multiplied and fractured in the ongoing stimulation of competition: “The society regulated by reference to the ‘market that the neoliberals are thinking about is a society in which the regulatory principle should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition." We are far beyond the politics of multiculturalism: diversity is the explicit aim of neoliberalism, as so many have argued (Duggan, Giroux). But because it is following out the logic of fungibility that the market demands, these differences are purely formal—they must be hollow, stripped of any historical residues, especially if those residues bring with them the ethical and political conflict of xenophobia.

#### Neoliberal fungibility also permeates into our debates about institutions. Challenging that commodification embraces an insurgent social life.

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The neoliberal imperium draws on fungibility as its major principle of ordering subjects, characterizing 'the worker' (and, thereby, 'the self') as an enterprise to be invested in (with nutrition, education, training and affection) and to discover new inventions as well (by endeavouring to produce surplus value) (Foucault [25]: 225). Winnubst argues: 'Neoliberalism [is] the formalising of social relations and difference into fungible units ... inequality is essential to stimulating market competition ... [it] must be intensified and multiplied until the social fabric becomes a conglomeration of diffuse, fungible differences' (2012: 93–4). In this view, sex becomes not sex, but a tool of social relations and difference to be operated on and deployed by markets – an 'erasure of history' of the sexuality (and pleasure) of sex (Winnubst [60]: 95). This argument becomes the foundation for a critique of the neoliberal order based on fungibility, where 'sexuality and sexual pleasures [appear] as exemplars of non-fungible limits to the enterprising rationality of neoliberalism' (Winnubst [60]: 97).

While sexual pleasure betrays the myth of fungibility, however, a critique of the current neoliberal order cannot stop here – it must also show the ways in which the myth of fungibility invisibilizes racialized and sexualized violences and pits 'sexual freedom' (which is, of course, not at all free) against those outside the limits, 'the uncreated source of creation' (Bourdieu cited in Barrett [ 5]: 29), of white supremacy's power and legal protections. It is not only 'the worker' and his/her/its 'sexuality' that are fungible; racialization is also employed as a signification of inferiority, colonization, the capitalist underclass and the lawless. Winnubst characterizes this as yet another of 'neoliberalism's structurally damaging effects' (2012: 97). In this view, the world is facing imminent 'rupture' that comes from a major tension in capital's infinite desire to expand everywhere, anywhere, and all the time all the while reasserting limits by articulating that its crises – sexual and otherwise – can be transcended through institutional and moral changes.

Rhetorical focus on institutions and morality evades the penetration of frontiers to constitute, capture and kill new spaces, sex and flesh for reconstructions and profit. Capital regimes require new forms of subjugation, centralizing sex and gendered technologies while sapping their erotic energies, capacities and life sources. Yet, any attempt to query this neoliberal imperium's series of events, discussions, and pushes from the vantage point of blackness (in Sexton's words, 'blackness as theory') reveals an anatomization of fungibility and accumulation as terror foundational to capitalist formations. More so, drawing on blackness as the analytical lens allows us to see the systematic ways that the generation of value is terror even when its ineluctable violence is sublimated by fetishizing boundaries (i.e., between queerness and race) all the while denying 'the original mechanism [terror and direct force] by means of which valuation initiates' (Barrett [ 5]: 28) as blackness and with 'flesh'. In conversation with Barrett and Sexton, I argue that the path to understanding sexuality as a commodification, as a resource of value and as an enslavement technology of blackness can provide a route to understanding the 'insurgent social life' as radical orientations that challenge and ruptures the neoliberal and white supremacist imperium's reproductive and generative approaches that embrace inheritance and trasubstantiation of death into heritage. To that end, I ask where (and how) does the generation of value in the form of queer sexual service capacity emerge? What is its value (if any) in the reproduction of a racialized global political order whose fundament is slaughter? What are the subjects, objects, the inert matter and processes that the order relies on for its reconstructions?

#### Resolutional debate requires one embrace static positions that embody queerness: on the affirmative, we defend breaking up corporations in service of a free market that will commodify queerness, and on the negative, we defend why the large corporations will be better for innovation while they are actively commodifying queerness. Switch-side debate is a ruse – it assumes the best-faith version of policy debaters who will actively include queer scholarship instead of rushing to “weigh the plan -- extinction outweighs!” while checking their backfiles for their “state is good for queer people” cards. Switch side debate is a marketing practice that makes queerness fungible by assuming that there is a good, legitimate way to inhabit queerness – that dogma is sold to queer people who are “making the game unfair” by inhabiting their identity – switch side debate is a privileged locale that assumes that one can tap in and out of their personal identity at will, which is a luxury only afforded to those embracing white, cis, heteronormativity.

#### That defense of the state only solidifies its monopoly on violence – the state is the arbiter of whether violence against others is justified -- that positions the trans/queer as near life – the negation of the rights-bearing subject that culiminates in overkill. The excessive damage done to individualized queers is indelibly associated with violence against queerness itself. Death is never enough, overkill becomes an iterative practice rationalized through the gay and trans panic defenses. After all, violence against that which is nothing is the foregone conclusion of “the double bind of inhabiting the place of both menace and void.” It is through the killing of trans/queer nothingness where the state must cohere itself.

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Surplus Violence

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as was the case with both Lauryn Paige and Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific person but the ending of trans/queer life itself. This is the time of trans/queer death—when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s immortality. If trans/queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing that which is constituted as already dead must go beyond normative times of life. In other words, if Lauryn Paige was dead after the first few stab wounds, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify?

The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay-panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of trans/queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina trans woman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the case of Gwen Araujo, J. Robles, and Lauryn Paige, after the murderer and victim had engaged in sex. The logic of the trans-panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding the place of nothingness. Overkill names the technologies necessary for, and the epistemic commitment to, doing away with that which is already gone. Here, trans/queer life is a threat that is so unimaginable that one is forced to not simply murder but to push the dead backward out of time, out of history, and into that which comes before. Yet this overkill registers as little in the social—the double bind of inhabiting the place of both menace and void.36

In thinking the overkill of Lauryn Paige Fuller and Rashawn Brazell, I return to the ontopolitical category of nothingness—the shadow of liberal democracy. The place of nothingness reemerges in its elegant precision with each case I offer—the repetitious futility of bringing into representation that which escapes it but remains in a para-vitalist order. By resituating this question in the positive, the something more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Here the category of the human assumes generality, yet is activated, or more precisely weaponized, in the specificity of history and politics. To this end, the human, the something of this query, names the rights-bearing subjects or those who can stand before the law—the beneficiary of equality. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human resides in the space of life, and under the domain of Man, whereas the trans/queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and in the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the trans/queer is the negation, through inclusive exclusion, of democracy’s proper subject.

Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable double of the human works to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and anti-trans/queer violence at large index a pathological break, and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is that which constitutes, via negation, equality’s form, which is lived by many as unfreedom. Or put another way, if the state is the enactment of a majoritarian collective unconscious, then its own intelligibility, or its own will to power, is rendered through the figure of the internal enemy and the mandatory forms of liquidation needed to face this inside/outside threat. Overkill, the calculated practice of gratuitous force, then, is the proper expression to the riddle of the trans/queer nothingness. However, the spectacular scene of overkill must not be singularly pathologized as this would, yet again, privatize violence’s epistemology under the individual while its structure remains intact. In the end, the killer never works alone. These vicious acts, therefore, must be held as an indictment of the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to that which is nothing.37

#### There is no epidermal quality intrinsic to trans/queerness, rather its ontology is forwarded through a flexible semiotics that state power operationalizes through violent inclusion and exclusion that is unequally distributed. Nonidentity is not totalizing, but rather provides an analytic of the nature of trans/queer violence.

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Gay Shame’s insistence on thinking both these iterations of racialized anti-trans/queer violence together is also the methodological commitment of this book. Araujo’s tragic murder might be primarily understood to be that of intersubjective violence, the phobic eruption of a personal relationship that became unbearable, and Akbar’s might function as a generic expression of the violence of the state form, once again levied against Blackness. Bringing them together, then, builds an analysis that is attentive to the scale of direct attack that is always staged within the language of the state that demands it. By tracing these edges, not only does an analysis of anti-trans/queer violence appear, but these connections allow for, or more pointedly order, a reading of normative power—modernity’s common sense—where Enlightenment’s dreams become our nightmares.9

This antagonism melds the spectacular murders of Jihad Alim Akbar and Gwen Araujo with the quotidian desires for destruction, including the sterilizing glares that rob one of the ability to sink into comfort. Besieged, the threat of harm reverberates in the fleshiness of the everyday, producing a kind of death-in-waiting lived as what Frantz Fanon called a “feeling of nonexistence.” Catastrophically, this imminent danger constitutes for the trans/queer that which is the sign of vitality itself, as possibility and limit are collapsed into one.

What, then, becomes of trans/queer life, if it’s produced through the negativity of forced death and at the threshold of obliteration? Pushed further, if trans/queer life is constituted in the social as empty of meaning beyond the anonymity of bone, what kind of violence is done to that which is never properly here?10

In another time and place, “Tiens, un nègre!”11 (“Look, a Negro!”12) opened Frantz Fanon’s chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of the Black” (L’expérience vécue du Noir), infamously mistranslated as “The Fact of Blackness.” Fanon enters here, as he does throughout this text, against a logic of flattened substitution and toward a political commitment to nonmimetic friction—the messiness of history and that history’s reemergence. After all, the racialized phenomenology of Blackness under colonization that Fanon illustrates may be productive to read against and with a continuum of anti-trans/queer racialized violence in the settler colony that is the United States. The visual’s capacity to capture through the dialectics of recognition and the scopic must figure with such a reading of race, gender, and sexuality. It is argued, and rightfully so, that the instability of trans/queerness obscures it from the epidermalization that anchors the idea of race in the fields of the visual. When thinking about the difference between anti-Semitism and racism, which for Fanon was a question of the visuality of oppression, he similarly suggests, “the Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness.”13 However, here it may be useful to reread Fanon through an understanding of the visual that reminds us that Jewish people can sometimes not be unknown in their Jewishness (including Jews of color), evidenced by the endurance of anti-Semitism. Or, this is to suggest that domination always exists within and also in excess of the representational, which includes the sensorium of its arrival—the extra-diegesis of difference.14

Similarly, I ask why anti-trans/queer violence, more often than not, is correctly levied against us. In other words, the discursive aim of liberalism that subsists under the sign of equality argues that trans/queerness is indistinguishable under the social order. This misses, or more precisely disappears, in the name of its own coherence—differences it cannot endure, while also harnessing difference as its organizing principle. Against such claims, I suggest that there are moments of figuration where trans/queerness does in fact signify differently, not because of an innate ontological structure but because of the ways ontology is naturalized through one’s place in the world. I’m not suggesting that there is an always locatable trans/queerness that exists outside historicity, but such a fiercely flexible semiotics might conditionally offer a way of knowing this violence that can withstand the weight of generality.15

Indeed, not all who might identify as either trans and/or queer experience the same relationship to violence. Such differentiation is the underside of this book as the consolidation of LGBT politics operates, perhaps most vividly, through an endless drive toward recognition before the law. As I glossed in the introduction, this demand for inclusion through the architecture of formal equality solidifies the attachment to the state as the primary, if not exclusive, method of transformation. Beyond thinking that equality is a less effective tactic in the struggle for freedom, here I understand equality as that which ensures that anything other remains unthinkable. While at times strategically necessary, organizing movements under its banner solidifies the idea that the same system that has been built and maintained through deadly inclusive exclusion is also where relief can be found.16

The betrayal that is LGBT equality takes form in the grim fact that the overwhelming proportion of trans/queer people who are murdered in the United States are of color; specifically, Black trans women endure the most vicious forms of quotidian and spectacular attack.17 Similarly, Black, Brown, and/or Indigenous trans/queer people who are surviving in spaces of hyper-control, from jails and psych prisons to public housing and ICE detention centers, along with those whose labor is criminalized, including sex workers and drug dealers, experience the intensification of this structuring violence as the predisposition to interpersonal attack. In contrast, many LGBT people in the United States who otherwise exist within white cis normativity may in their daily lives know very little about either systematic or personal harm. The long history and magnified present of LGBT assimilation illustrates these varying degrees of life chances available to some, that under the democratic order come at the expense of others. In contrast, I am marking trans/queer as the horizon where identity crumbles and vitality is worked otherwise. Here, trans/queer might be a productive placeholder to name a nonidentity where force is made to live. This is not to suggest that the negativity of trans/queerness and methodologies of annihilation define the end of our sociality or that the parameters of opposition are sedimented as such. As is cataloged throughout this text, our legacies of wild revolt—fashioning a world without vertical genealogies—insists that trans/queerness remains as generativity’s future present.18

#### If debate has become the site of anti-queer violence, the response to debate must be refusal – a generative ethic of ungovernability which disrupts the coherence of the social that is grounded upon queer death. Ungovernability reclaims an independent, queer social world that embraces the non-sociality that prefigures trans/queer life. Reject static ways of debating the resolution – ungovernability allows us to iterate strategies of resistance within debate that escapes queer overkill. Debates residing in ungovernability provide a deliberative process that culminates in shared strategy for queer survival.

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Seditious Life

In defiance of both the liberal statist hypothesis that the social order would, given the direct power, equally distribute life chances, and a libertarian antistatism that believes all structures that do not directly benefit them are impediments to their free market of domination, is the protracted struggle of trans/queer sedition. While this might appear adjacent to a left melancholia or perhaps nihilistic edgeplay, the difference between reconsolidation and resistance, accommodation and refusal, is precisely how we inhabit impossibility. It is not that we have no tradition to look toward that offers beyond the cold desolation that insists, yet again, on democracy’s modification as our only chance. Grown through this boundless violence is also an ecstatic vitality, even in death, that builds a collective revolt beyond the reign of pragmatism and its armored logics.13

If the attempt to fashion a more perfect democracy is also the order under which its deadly force expands, then ungovernability becomes an abolitionist way of life. The charge of ungovernability, a behavior recast as being, disturbs not just the social but the social’s coherence that designates some existence as beautiful disruption. Sylvia Rivera’s 1973 climb to the top of a TERF-swarmed stage and her exasperated “Revolution now!” was not just another politic. It opened, by way of desecrating the political, toward a post-politic. In effect, she cleared a path through the resolve of brutality she knew as democracy’s nonchoice. Outvoted by the Gay Liberation Front and Gay Activist Alliance, silenced by the Gay Freedom Day’s vocal majority, she, along with her STAR sisters, knew there was no home to be found there. It was her unruliness, the inability of either normative culture or the lesbian and gay political order to contain her that she was deeply punished for. However, it was also her riotous theory in action.14

Ungovernability finds its legal application in the juvenile court system as a charge for youth who live in refusal. Not surprisingly, Black and Brown trans/queer youth are often judged as such for repudiating the authority of a parent or guardian. These “status offenses,” which include truancy, running away, and consuming alcohol, are actions that break the law only because the accused is under legal age. As wards, the legal category of youth produces numerically young people under the jurisdiction of others and who are to some degree also their legal responsibility. This unique relationship became nefariously clear when Kamala Harris chose to aggressively prosecute the parents of Black and Brown truant youth when she was the district attorney of San Francisco.15

The assumed protocol via federal guidelines is to keep young people with their legal guardians if they appear in youth courts under status offenses. Yet, for others it is a homophobic and/or transphobic parent who is petitioning to have them removed from their custody and placed in juvenile jail. The non-personhood of trans/queer youth is confirmed through the mark of ungovernability in an attempt to relinquish legal accountability. As is undeniable, trans/queer youth are habitually physically and emotionally terrorized in schools; then, in an attempt to survive, they often refuse to return. Truancy, for most young people, would not find them in juvenile jails, but if their parent or guardian is also invested in their desolation then the lockup is almost certain.

Along with truancy, the sexual practices (even as accusation) of trans/queer youth can find them beyond the governance of their parents’ projected cis heterosexuality. In deep Foucauldian realness the court performs its disgust by demanding every titillating detail. The state revels in its forced disclosure. These youth are rendered “incorrigible” because of consensual queer sex, while their straight peers escape the severity of such consequences. Moralism reappears in the *neutral* space of the court to reconfirm the court’s affinity to non-neutrality. Trans/queer youth are also sometimes held in contempt for presenting in a way that confirms their gender if that presentation contests the judge’s desire. Compounding the cycles of incarceration, if youth that are awaiting trial have been removed from their parents’ or guardians’ custody, they are often forced to remain incarcerated in pretrial detention. De facto sumptuary laws and sexual morality become relegislated as the conditions of captivity for youth who refuse to remain an “object in the midst of other objects.”16

“The child’s habitual disregard of the lawful and reasonable demands of his caretakes and that the child is beyond their control”: thus the Louisiana Children’s Code designates ungovernability as twinned evasion.17 Given the state’s foundational violence, being beyond the control of that same system is also an attempt to find safe passage out of it. Indeed, the practices of trans/queer youth, their ability to figure a social world out of the antisociality that envelops them, are not simply a survival strategy, although they are that. A life lived below the incessant charge of bad choices, for those without any good ones, scavenges a post-political plan of attack—youth liberation as guerrilla warfare to destitute the state.18

Such contemptuous living, even in the small space of habitual disregard, is countered by harm’s escalation, here in the form of youth imprisonment. Yet these practices of refusal also open possibility after anything that might resemble options has disappeared. While the state pathologizes and criminalizes young people’s ungovernability as yet another symptom of their unwillingness to adhere to white civil society, their methods persist as a rebellion against that which produces them as persons in waiting, at best, while practice relegating them to democracy’s negativity. Or, put another way, these acts stack together to reveal shared tactics of survival—a sociality of bad kids who know the goodness of group disruption.

#### The iterative, ongoing nature of debate ensures that we can make space for the queer Other in debate – only a discursive refusal of traditional norms of debate can challenge the commodified roles that constitute queer existence.

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QUEERING ANARCHIST PEDAGOGIES

Part of poststructuralist, queer, and gender theories' contributions to social theory are criticisms of binary thinking and understandings of our world(s). Queer and (some) gender theories critique the binaries of hetero/homo, man/woman, etc. (e.g., see Butler [11]; Halperin [38]; Sedgwick [74]; Queen and Schimel [68]; Warner [82]). We can likewise apply this project of unpacking and releasing borders of gender and sexuality to the project of dropping the walls around the roles of teacher and student" (in the academic world and beyond). In fact, breaking down this false binary of teacher/student is a necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships and practicing prefigurative politics. For a consistent and ethical practice, we need to assume egalitarian social relations in our classrooms in contrast to the hierarchical relationships promoted through various mechanisms by academic institutions. Educational and pedagogical philosophers have written and spoken at length about the benefits of this (e.g., see DeLeon [18], [19], [20], [21]; Armaline [ 3]; DeLeon and Love 2009; Shukaitis [77]; Kahn [50]; Suissa [78]).

Queer theory offers us new theoretical bases from which we can deconstruct those kinds of binary understandings and create a social practice that tries to blur those distinctions in real time. Judith Butler has written at length on gender performativity—by which she means that gender is not only socially constructed, but that it is iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos (Butler [ 8], [10]). Performativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role. This incorrect (yet often misunderstood as such) notion would assume that we have agency that allows us to choose any gender we desire to perform, and this, for obvious reasons, invisibilizes one of the more important angles of Butler's point: that we are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities (Butler [ 8], [10]). Her point here is more to illustrate that we don't freely choose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations (our repetitions of such roles in our own localized contexts), we simultaneously buttress such cultural norms—or—we challenge such roles by our strategic and unfaithful iterations. This is where anarchist/queer vitality comes in. Instead of obediently reproducing our idea of what a particular role should be, we might play with what a role could be.

If we look at the roles of teacher and student as iterative performances in a similar light as Butler's notion of gender performativity, we can get an inkling as to where we can strategically challenge normative roles such as teacher and student and the relationship between the two. For instance, Butler theorizes that because gender is performative and iterative of cultural norms and status quos, that these roles simultaneously constitute us as social beings (in these particular roles) all the while caging us within their particular borders. The place, then, that we can look to subvert these status quos and norms is located within the act of iteration itself. We need to iterate roles (that are simultaneously reiterative) to become a social being—we will not be able to do away with (re)iterations because we cannot escape the world of discourse. But what we can do, as Butler ([ 8], [10]) notes, is subvert such status quos (teacher and student) by iterating in a fresh, lively way—by iterating differently. This is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society (regime). We might uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo. As Claudia W. Ruitenberg ([72], 265) writes, "Discursive constitution is not discursive determinism." This is great news because it means we can be unfaithful to our expected repetitions and be subversive when we perform roles such as teacher and/or student; (Butler [10]; Heckert [42]). Instead, we might be faithful to what is alive within us.

It's important to note that when we are dreaming of ways that we can do the roles of teacher and student differently, that as important as our own strategic and playful iterations of status quos (gently allowing for the subversion of hierarchical roles and creating newer, freer, and more fluid roles) are, those of us in the situation will bring our body-memories of roles. We might find ourselves acting out teacher or student, even though we didn't mean to. Or others might be caught up in their own expectations and not understand that it's possible to do things differently. From my past experiences:

I was in a high school once, teaching sex education. As we went around the circle introducing ourselves, I came to realize that three of the young men were stoned. 'Oh, no!' I thought to myself. As I was explaining how this would be different from our school usually was, one of them asked me to slow down and repeat. He was confused, and I don't think it was just from cannabis. That might have simply made him more honest and less concerned about appearing confused. I knew that what I was doing was radically unschool-like because I had been iterating myself differently for some years. But for them, it was brand new and I couldn't simply tell them it would be different. Why should they believe me against the weight of their experience? I had to show them through my practice and give them time to adjust, to understand that another classroom was possible. I'm grateful to the young man for reminding me of this.

Norms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time. What we mean here is that there is a "cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse" (Ruitenberg [72], 263). Identity categories are "cumulatively produced" by such things as "advertising, school texts, sitcoms, legal discourse, and so on" (Ruitenberg [72], 263). Although we still feel excited about subverting the status quo of such roles in small places such as within our own classrooms—we understand our lively and subversive iterations as one strategy among many others that might be taken up to truly change the relationships and constitutions of the roles of teacher and student.

Johnston and Klandermans suggest "a performative view of culture stresses that social movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it" ([47], 9). If we both live within discursive regimes that constitute our identities, and also have access to a vital agency that allows us to iterate roles and identities differently and subversively, what might (or does) this look like in the classroom? What kind of behavior can we see when teachers and students iterate their roles differently, fluidly, and prefiguring the participatory and egalitarian (and creative!) world(s) in which we want to (and could) live?

Ruitenberg ([72], 265–266) writes "Educators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them." We argue that teachers, themselves, might well take this to heart in considering their own roles as subjects. From my experiences:

As a new graduate student, I am slowly discovering the little ways with which I can reorganize the physical architecture of the classroom I'm given. For instance, I prefer to have the classroom set up as a circle of chairs rather than a room that positions myself at the front with all the students facing me. However, I think it's most likely better practice to actually ask the students how they would prefer to have the room set up, although I like to explain the reasons why I prefer the classroom in this way.

We take heart from a long tradition in critical pedagogy questioning the relationship between teachers and students. As Paulo Freire ([32]) wrote, "Education must begin with the solution of the teacher–student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously students and teachers" (72). And as Luhmann ([56]) points out, undermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions of hetero/homo and man/woman. Because the role of student and teacher are embodied roles (Shapiro and Shapiro [76]), we need to be aware of our bodies and how they are being related to each other; to learn how we might release the postures of authority or submission. We can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way. How would we want classrooms to function in the worlds we desire to live in? We would like to see classrooms where participants are invited to honor their own experience (while questioning their stories about that experience) above and beyond ideas or practices offered by teachers. That is, we want to see practices of self-loving in the classroom. We also value the open-hearted honesty of teachers who are able to talk about what they/we learn from the experience of working with those labeled students. What mutuality exists without that acknowledgment, out of a desire to maintain clear identities, out of fear? As bell hooks ([45]) has argued, fear and love cannot occupy the same space. If the classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. "The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field" (Carillo Rowe [12], 43). The key for the so-called teacher, then, is to learn to release fear, to be present with it without getting caught up in it. To let themselves be loving.

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#### It’s important to historicize queer resistance to the work of queer and trans Black women, only the permutation contextualizes both

**Charrett 18** (Catherine Charrett, associate lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, “Diplomacy in drag and queer IR art: Reflections on the performance, ‘Sipping Toffee with Hamas in Brussels’”, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/diplomacy-in-drag-and-queer-ir-art-reflections-on-the-performance-sipping-toffee-with-hamas-in-brussels/FE97388F6A1E6C6606C440004F5D7669/core-reader>, published October 2018, accessed 2020, IOWA RC)

The production of performance art allowed me to create a fictional space, a space of the ‘what if’ to stage an alternative coming together of the diplomatic figures, Hamas, and the EU. Feminist writing relies on the scripting of alternative futures or of imaginary spaces to re-envision political possibilities in the present. Neta Crawford writes on feminist science fiction, which takes the givens of our social world(s) and use them as mirror, foil and canvas. Through the imagining of possible world, we may come to understand our own world better, to recognise its historical construction, and to imagine new configurations, possibilities that are not constrained by pre-existing ideas and precedent logics … . 67 Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling speak of creativity and poisies as a way to imagine an alternative construct of politics beyond the colonial capitalist-patriarchy.68 Elina Penttinen writes of shifting away from an ontology of suffering and towards a politics of possibility, by focusing on instances and experiences of success, relief, and positive change in international politics.69 Penttinen’s writing on the ability of female peacekeepers to approach their work with professionalism, ethics, mindfulness, and respectful relationships provides a map for learning and growth. These feminist interventions emphasise the need for alternative departure points, such as creativity, imagination, fiction, or mindfulness from which to reinvigorate political critique and the building of community. Butler discusses the importance of the alternative imaginary space in Hannah Arendt’s piece, Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which Arendt invokes an ‘ideal judge’ to fashion ‘possibilities of political belonging that do not rely on established forms of individualism’. 70 The question of the ‘what if’ provides an alternative departure point from which to think about politics: what if politics looked like this instead? Rather, than beginning from a place of subjugation, oppression, and marginalisation the alternative ontological arrangement begins from a place of hope, community, and justice. In Butler’s reading of Mahmoud Darwish’s poems, the questions of the ‘not yet’ or the ‘what if’ are very present. ‘[These] questions seek to open up a future under the conditions in which the future has been foreclosed or in which the future can only be thought as repeated subjugation.’ 71 The objective is to think of a political future that does not repeat a discourse of colonial subjugation, or a future that is not already closed down by an existing discourse of threat. In an endeavour to rethink co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians from the departure point of the shared experience of the refugee, Butler writes: ‘Exile is the name of separation, but alliance is found precisely there, not yet in a place, in a place that was and is and in the impossible place of the not yet happening now.’ 72 Queer artistic practices reconfigure ideas around community, love, and belonging. The contemporary music of Janelle Monáe is drag, androgynous, and queer, and may be described in the genre of Afrofuturism.73 Monáe’s album Dirty Computer articulates important tropes of black resistance and liberation, but also emphasises that these movements were not inclusive of alternative iterations of gender and sexuality. Adrienne Brown writes that Monáe’s work celebrates diverse sexual experience and love. It foregrounds intimacy between black women, and offers a reading of pussy-power that is tender, intimate, and playful. Huey Newton’s trademark wicker chair is transposed into a white floral throne, while Monáe wears tailored suits that evoke the Nation of Islam, now paired with white leather stiletto boots. The video essentially fuses the Nation of Islam with Rhythm Nation, as Monáe both attends to and exceeds the contours of the masculinist fantasia that is commonly taken as the black revolutionary imagination in popular culture.74 Monáe’s work may ultimately give voice to a broader vision of justice or equality than articulated by predecessors in the civil rights movements, argues Brown. It sends as a message of black feminist collectivity in order to decentralise conventions of love, family, and respectability.75 In the space of the ‘what if’, imaginations are allowed to reconstitute forms of community and belonging. My performance piece presents an alternative coming together between Hamas and the EU. Performance art challenges the teleological boundaries of what might be possible in politics. In this way, the performance space acts as an experimental, provocative, and performative space that presents political conversations, which did not occur but which could occur. This fiction will be that which exceeds the established framework for understanding reality; it will exceed established modes of rule and precedent, social facts, and challenge the limits of established ontology.76 In presenting an alternative ontological arrangement through live art, drag performance as a method of critique contributes to conversations on alternative departure points. What if Hamas and the EU had met following the elections, what might they have said? This question, I argue invites a creativity in our response, as academics and political thinkers to a pervious political ‘impasse’. It permits considering an alternative political arrangement; one that does not begin from the place of an anxious attachment to a form of strategic thinking under which the possibility of such a conversation had been excluded. Near to the end of some of my interviews in Gaza I would ask the fictional or hypothetical questions, ‘What if you were invited to Brussels to meet with an EU representative, what would you say?’ or ‘What if the EU had decided to respect the election result, what would life be like?’ These were always bizarre and happy questions and responses. A smile or smirk appeared. There is a sense of hope or creativity that is performatively uttered through the imaginative questions. The responses were always filled with a desire for positive change, as well as a certain amount of sadness for what did not occur. Jamil al-Khalidi, head of the Central Elections Commission for Gaza responded, I believe if the Europeans particularly dealt with Hamas as a winner in the elections, or if they accepted the coalition government that included ministers from Hamas and Fatah, I think this was a precious opportunity that the EU had foregone. And if this had happened, it would have been possible to reach common grounds between the Europeans and the coalition government that included Hamas. This would have saved the region lots of troubles and it could have been possible to reach at least an interim solution that can be the beginning to a comprehensive solution.77 Huda Naim, Head of Women’s issues, Hamas leader responded, A nice picture. The people would not be suffering as much as they are suffering now. The people would also believe that the Europeans really believe in democracy. We are not saying that the EU are one whole, there are different positions. But in this position to turn their back on us and on democracy they were one whole.78 The fictional question pushes the conversation into an alternative reality, one that is perhaps less conditioned by the hegemonic practices that had structured the diplomatic exchange previously. The performance space, or the space of the fiction allows for such creativity.

#### The strategy of contextualizing queerness historically involves a radical reorientation of our current epistemic and political projects – queering freedom is a call for a small utterance in the culture of phallicized whiteness in an attempt to expose the buried archives of ever-shifting queerness. This is a betrayal of a normative representation of the topic, but more importantly, it is a betrayal of ourselves.

Winnubst 6

Shannon Winnubst, associate professor in the Department of Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the Ohio State University, Queering Freedom, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, KB modified

A Practice in General Economics

In his three-volume work on political economy, The Accursed Share, Bataille describes and performs a kind of thinking that emerges out of “general economies.” This involves a radical reorientation from the epistemological and political projects of modernity, where clarity and precision are the hallmarks of insight, argumentation, and good thinking. He frames his own project of political economy as the study of the movement “of excess energy, translated into the effervescence of life” (1988–91, 1:10), a project that involves “the movement of energy on the earth—from geophysics to political economy, by way of sociology, history, and biology . . . [with essential connections to] art, literature, poetry” (1988–91, 1:10). It is about everything, and thus risks being about nothing: the growth and stagnation of duckweed on a pond tells us more about the general economy than the sale of wheat (1988–91, 1:32–33). It threatens to become the Hegelian nightmare where all cows are black: all things are connected, and thus it appears that nothing is distinguished.

In writing in this way, Bataille realizes the impossibility of his own project, particularly in the historical present of late western modernity, where temporal and spatial norms demand the constant forward march of sequential, distinct units of meaning. How to undertake a project that issues from the utter excess of expenditure, joy, and luxury in a world that demands the unquestioned reduction of all values to the needs of utility, reason, and labor? How to write of “propositions according to which it is not necessity but its contrary, ‘luxury,’ that presents living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems” (1988–91, 1:12)?

Bataille asks us to think with him in these general ways, where questions of economics may land us in unexpected meditations on the sun rituals of Aztecs (as in his volume 1) and questions of freedom may land us in unexpected meditations on the temporality of ironing shirts (as in my chapter 5). This thinking cannot shape itself “if it [does] not consider the totality of small occurrences, wrongly supposed to be insignificant” (1988–91, 1:13). Attempting to think in these general economies when turning to systems of domination may require us to consider dynamics not usually deemed relevant to discussions of domination and resistance. For example, we may have to consider how the enclosure of private property into the conceptual unit of individual rights in the seventeenth century affects how we live and how we perpetuate a racist world of white domination (chapter 1). Or how the psychoanalytic theory of ego development leads us into temporalities of domination (chapter 2). Or how the Aristotelian concept of space leads us into concepts of desire that frame contemporary conflicts over marriage as a political and religious institution (chapters 3 and 4). In closing our thinking to such kinds of interconnective dynamics, the dominant form of modern rationality totalizes our sense of the world: instrumental reason subordinates all other kinds of knowing to its final mandates, reducing our worlds and lives to calculations of utility. It is this severance from a more general perspective, one that approaches the circulation of energy beyond the closed frame of immediate utility, that Bataille calls on us to resist.

Bringing Foucault to bear, I add some urgency to Bataille’s calls: it is through this severance from a more general perspective that systems of domination perpetuate themselves in the very fabric of our experiences and lives. In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault writes of thinking from the historical present, that space which orients thinking toward its own historico-cultural conditioning and the ~~blind spots~~ [conceptual shortfalls] which circulate within it to keep systems of power intact.1 We must not mistake this for the Kantian schema of transcendental conditions of pure reason with history tacked on. Nor is it the Hegelian schema of Reason assuming historical shape: to think from the historical present is not to think of how the universal structures of reason express themselves in historical formations. To think from the historical present is to attempt at every stage, position, and moment of thinking to turn back upon that thinking and sort out its particular contours: why appeal to the concept of rights when theorizing about freedom? Or why theorize freedom at all? Why assume the clearly demarcated individual as the basic unit of ethical thinking? How are we subtly demanding some future and useful solution to the questions that we pose in our very posing of them?

These are the kinds of questions and connections I explore in this text. They spring from a more general question, one that brings Bataille and Foucault together: is our thinking in late modernity historically conditioned to function only within (allegedly) closed economies, and if so, does this render us helpless in any effort to resist structures of domination? For example, thinking from the historical present in the U.S., where violence and politics are deeply racialized, we are called upon to think about the contours and dynamics of race and racism. Race functions as a fundamental category through which we conceive of our identities and racism is the system through which this category operates. Accordingly, when we ask the question of racism in the U.S., we most often turn to questions of history (slavery, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement), psychology (superiority, narcissism, the buzzword of ‘privilege’), or politics (social movements, the construction of whiteness as a strategy of solidarity across class boundaries, the subtle dynamics of exclusion). But, heeding Bataille’s warnings about closed economies, we must probe the ~~blind spots~~ [conceptual shortfalls] of these very approaches. What if race and racism, along with other systems of domination, are not reducible to these closed economies of history, psychology, and politics? What if we need to reorient ourselves toward a different kind of thinking, one that can excavate the closed economies of domination through the normativity of their spatio-temporal frameworks?

Bataille gives us a concrete example of the difference that thinking generally enacts on our political and philosophical sensibilities. Writing of his own project, he explains,

When it is necessary to change an automobile tire, open an abscess or plow a vineyard, it is easy to manage a quite limited operation. The elements on which the action is brought to bear are not completely isolated from the rest of the world, but it is possible to act on them as if they were: one can complete the operation without once needing to consider the whole, of which the tire, the abscess or the vineyard is nevertheless an integral part. . . . [T]hings are different when we consider a substantial economic activity such as the production of automobiles in the United States, or, a fortiori, when it is a question of economic activity in general. . . . [B]ut the economy taken as a whole is usually studied as if it were a matter of an isolatable system of operation. (1988–91, 1:19)

This is the domination and violence of our historical present, late modernity: to reduce our lives so completely to the order of instrumental reason that we cannot conceive of any political or philosophical problem without reducing it to that narrow conception of reason. This renders us captive to presuppositions which assume that solutions to problems must follow the same temporal register as the posing of the problem itself—i.e., that they must appear immediately effective and useful if we are to recognize them as solutions at all. But what if these are only truncated, shortsighted views? What if a vital resistance to politics of domination comes through freeing ourselves from these closed economies of late modernity and their clearly demarcated, controlled, mastered, and useful ends? What if a vital resistance to politics of domination requires a temporal register other than that of immediate and clear efficacy?

As Bataille tells us sympathetically, “It is not easy to realize one’s own ends if one must, in trying to do so, carry out a movement that surpasses them” (1988–91, 1:21). His orientation toward general economies asks us to think differently from the habituated patterns of our historical present. In his language, this historical present is “characterized by the fact that judgments concerning the general situation proceed from a particular point of view” (1988–91, 1:39). This particularity can be outlined, described, pinned down, and its blind spots excavated: I attempt to do so in this text. But to think generally from and about the historical present may lead us into different questions and different orientations: it has led me to query systems of domination through the registers of temporality and spatiality, while framing them through the identity categories (race, gender, sexuality, class, religion) that are their most explicit historical tools. For example, how does the temporality of a persistent future orientation ground systems of racism, sexism, and heterosexism? What assumptions about the ontology of space allow for the biological conception of race that grounds racism, or of sex that grounds sexism and heterosexism?

Bataille warns us that, if we do not learn to think in this counter-cultural register of general economy, we will always be subordinated to the violent and even catastrophic expressions of the excess, abundant energy of the planet, such as war and imperialist domination. We do have a choice in this matter. But that choice is not one which will derive from calculating our interest, analyzing the specific problem, or charting the solution: it will not derive from the domains of instrumental reason and its persistent mandate of utility. It may, rather, involve recuperating senses of freedom lost to us in late modernity, where nation-states promise freedom as the facile liberation from subservience and mastery as the domination of nature and culture. To think generally may lead toward sensing freedom as “a dangerous breakingloose . . . a will to assume those risks without which there is no freedom”

(1988–91, 1:38). It is toward recuperating these more general senses of freedom, which Bataille signifies as “sovereign” and I signify as “queer” in this historical period of late modernity and phallicized whiteness, that this text moves.

A Foucaultian Archaeology, Of Sorts

I always think of Foucault’s The Order of Things as beginning with his brilliant readings of Vela´zquez’s Las Meninas. But in fact, in the good Foucaultian fashion of troubling and confusing origins, it begins before that: the preface begins with Borges. Foucault writes at length of the nervous and slightly anxious laughter that erupts upon reading Borges’s recounting of ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia.’2 He describes it as a disruptive and even violent, if playful, laughter, one that “shattered all the familiar landmarks of my thought—of our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography” (1970, xv). Piling text upon text, Foucault suggests that The Order of Things emerged as a response to Borges’s account of this Chinese text. But how are we to read such a simple claim to an origin by this thinker of ‘anti-origins,’ this archaeologist and genealogist, this figure who seems always incapable of beginning?

Foucault depicts Borges’s text almost entirely in the register of space— the space that it opens and the many familiar spaces of our thought that it resists or even undercuts. Citing this strange ‘Chinese encyclopedia,’ Borges’s text offers a taxonomy of animals: “(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f ) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies” (Foucault 1970, xv). Foucault’s response is direct and explicit: the fable demonstrates, through the exotic charm of another system of thought, “the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that” (1970, xv). It is not the fantastic, or even its contrast with the real, that our system of thought cannot think. It is the simple and elegant power of the alphabetical series. The sequential listing links “each of those categories to all the others” (1970, xxvi), leaving an uncomfortable, slim, even impossible “narrowness” separating the phantasms of the imagination from the materiality of the real. It is this danger of losing all separation between these realms that threatens our thinking, and from which our thinking reels back in terror. There is not sufficient space between these categories. The clear demarcation has slipped away, eroded to the point that the binary system of ‘fantasy/real’ no longer has sufficient purchase to capture the error at work here. These categories must be delimited if we are to grasp their qualitatively different ontological work in the world. And that demand is scoffed at here. There is a grave category error here. And this is impossible to think.

Foucault casts this slippage in terms that anchor my text: it is the impossibility of containment, a slippage in what I have termed ‘the logic of the limit.’ As he spatializes the phenomenon, he writes, “Where else could [these categories] be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language? Yet, though language can spread them before us, it can do so only in an unthinkable space” (1970, xvi–xvii). This space is unthinkable because, as Foucault diagnoses across all of his texts, our thought—the thought of late western modernity, the thought of phallicized whiteness that champions a very particular concept of freedom—is inextricably entangled with the logic of the limit. And Borges’s list (for we do finally read it as Borges’s, and not China’s, in our own ordering of the text as fable) presents us with a thought that is not bound to this logic, that does not operate in the space of thinking that demands a stable relation of container to contained between categories. A long passage from Foucault captures the impossibility concisely:

The central category of animals ‘included in the present classification,’ with its explicit reference to paradoxes we are familiar with, is indication enough that we shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of contained to container between each of these categories and that which includes them all; if all the animals divided up here can be placed without exception in one of the divisions of this list, then aren’t all the other divisions to be found in that one division too? And then again, in what space would that single, inclusive division have its existence? Absurdity destroys the and of the enumeration by making impossible the in where the things enumerated would be divided up. (1970, xvii) This is the space of thinking that our thought cannot enter. Our thought demands that we think in some space, a space that grants us the possibility of ordering the world. And Borges’s text “does away with [this] site, the mute ground upon which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed” (1970, xvii).

In breaking open the arbitrary power of listing, Borges jars thinking into the space in which order is demanded and not yet fulfilled. Foucault describes this space as “a domain which, even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is nonetheless fundamental” (1970, xx). It is the space in which thinking realizes the arbitrariness of the cultural codes into which it is habituated, and simultaneously cannot expunge the need for order itself. It is a difficult space to pin down or analyze. Hovering between the ordering codes of the culture and scientific or philosophical reflections upon order itself, it is the space of recognition that order, albeit arbitrary and historical, exists. Order is that without which thinking cannot think. It exists. And Borges’s text, in ushering us into this unnerving, vertiginous space, spars with the possibility of a world in which it might not. He removes “the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space” (1970, xvii).

Foucault continues to develop this space as a space that is more threatening than a mere disorder of the incongruous. It is the space of differing differences—of heterotopias and the heteroclite, where “things are ‘laid,’ ‘placed,’ ‘arranged’ in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all” (1970, xvii–xviii). These spaces “destroy syntax in advance” and “stop words in their tracks” (1970, xviii). More generally, these figures of heterotopias and the heteroclite open thinking onto that space in which thinking is faced with the very task of making order. Returning to this discussion of Foucault in chapter 4, I signify these spaces as “queer”—spaces where meaning is not preordained as a useful or recognizable telos, and the possibilities of other sorts of meaning, often those lost in the past, are still viable. Such spaces jar us from the ruts of our historical habits, inviting us into differing and vertiginous senses of freedom that cannot be contained by the historical present of phallicized whiteness. It is toward such spaces that the following discussions attempt to move.

#### Conceptions of flesh aren’t monolithic or fixed---Spillers theorizes flesh as something that is disruptive through performances that embrace metaphor through aesthetics that are situated in otherwise possibilities – which means the permutation has generative potential and proves our arguments about contextualization

Infante 20 – [Chad Benito Infante Murder and Metaphysics Leslie Marmon Silko’s “Tony’s Story” and Audre Lorde’s “Power”, OTHER WISE WORLDS Against Settler Colonialism and Anti- Blackness] mads

The flesh is the ground from which life emerges. The flesh is not reducible to Blackness—but Blackness, Black life, Black sociality, vibration, verve, ongoing movement and restiveness are irreducible in the flesh. Blackness finds its emergence in the resistance, the movement, of the flesh. For Spillers to argue in favor of the flesh, the flesh as liberatory, is for her to disrupt theology-philosophy as a modality of thought. She implies the disruptive potentiality Blackness poses for epistemological delimitation of thought that produces and is produced by what Wynter so forcefully elaborates in her essays as western Man. Such Man is the coloniality of being/power/truth/ freedom.9 Spillers and Wynter work in the plural space of otherwise possibility to think otherwise worlds of relationality, otherwise modalities for existence. Spillers radicalizes John by mobilizing him to the level of a specific generality. Rather than flesh being made from word, from logos that precedes, flesh is that which stands before any such possibility for words to name, claim, shame. Spillers demonstrates how the flesh instead becomes word, through violent encounter, through theological-philosophical adjudication. What our language sees and calls, language that is infused with the logics of white supremacist ideology, are not bodies but words, confused conceptions that create Man. What if the flesh was made word, was made to be constrained by the sign, the symbol. As word, it is that which always fails to fully capture the uncapturable liberatory vibration of the flesh, it is that which had to be transformed through theology and philosophy in order to produce the sense, the coherence, of Western epistemologies. All we have is metaphor. Each word, phrase, and statement merely approaches concepts we would seek to name or claim. All we have is the capacity for metaphor as irreducible relationality, of objects being with other objects, of ideas and concepts forming through relation. Metaphor is excess, excess that is constitutive of otherwise possibilities. Metaphor is excess that precedes any movement or nomination toward word, toward phrase, toward statement. This excess, as metaphor, is the grounds for thinking Black life, life that constantly escapes into the zone of relation, life that refuses to leave excess as grounding. It is why Black dance, vibration, good vibration and movement, is found at the moment, at the site, of disruptive noise in Baltimore. What else would cause folks to dance, to make a metaphoric statement that exceeds the bounds of sense? Music and dance, sound and choreography, are metaphors, are the performed excess of something heard, something, in the flesh, felt—some vibration or movement—that performance seeks to discover continually. Music and dance, sound and choreography, approach that which was felt, approach that excess pulse and rhythm that remained. Like ceaseless misunderstood tears after a dream. Words only gain their meaning by relation, by what precedes and comes after. Words await excess to establish connection. It is this generative opacity of excess that Spillers and Wynter both elaborate.

#### That totalizing view of blackness blankets over the disproportionate amount of violence done to black quare people in comparison to black men, which means the aff cannot resolve the textures of blackness.

Samudzi 16 (Zoe Samudzi, June 13, 2016, “The Black movement To Come,” The New Inquiry, <https://thenewinquiry.com/the-black-movement-to-come/)> KVA

Black revolutionary energies in the past have deliberately excluded and discriminated against cisgender women as well as queer and transgender individuals. And, sadly, they continue to do so. Community solidarity is presumed to be the exclusive province of cisgender, heterosexual black men because narratives around various forms of state violence tend to be gendered male. When a black man is murdered by the state, the community takes to the street to mourn him. When the same state violence touches the lives of women, the community takes out handkerchiefs to grieve and sympathize with them for the loss of their men. Women whose end is the same as male victims are met with silence rather than reciprocal support. Carceral structures collapse the vast spectrum of black gendered and sexual identities to the status of criminal on the basis of the widely held assumption that it simply could not be otherwise. This criminalizing tendency affects queer and trans black individuals differently that it does cisgender heterosexual men. Non-normative gendered and sexualized bodies are not only criminal on the basis of blackness; they are also deemed wrong-bodied and deviant. Tanisha Anderson, Rekia Boyd, Miriam Carey, Michelle Cusseaux, Shelly Frey, Kayla Moore, Yvette Smith, Yuvette Henderson, Darnisha Harris, Malissa Williams, Aiyana Stanley-Jones (a child), Tarika Wilson—the Twitter hashtag #SayHerName brought these names and others to the fore. They belong to black women and girls who, like many men before and after them, had all been killed in encounters with the police. Though the act of saying their names may appear to threaten and undermine black male dominance, it is not meant to. The names neither compete nor attempt to overshadow; they serve simply to offer a fuller picture of a community’s ongoing destruction. A fuller picture still would be gained from saying the names Papi Edwards, Lamia Beard, Ty Underwood, Penny Proud, London Chanel, Jasmine Collins, India Clarke, Shade Schuler, Amber Monroe, Kandis Capri, Elisha Walker, Keisha Jenkins, and Zella Ziona. These belonged to trans individuals whose deaths went relatively unnoticed and unacknowledged due to the indifference to trans issues and active oppression of black trans women that characterizes a black liberation politics organized around cisgender identities. One might ask whether many popular conceptions of justice account for intracommunal gendered violence, and whether a “justice or else!” ultimatum accounts for the frustration of women unable to cope with black patriarchal structures and conventions as well as physical violence visited on them at the hands of black men. Any collective understanding of blackness that excludes compounding identities is a violent mythology; it holds that blacks are discriminated against solely on the basis of skin color. Yet black feminist and womanist forebears have demonstrated that in determinations of blackness the violence stemming from gender and class plays a role as well. The result is what prominent black feminist Patricia Hill-Collins has termed “interlocking systems of oppression.” Race, gender, class, and physical ability have become inextricably linked in understanding blackness and systemic oppression. Structures of whiteness certainly pre-date black chattel slavery in the United States. Nonetheless, this institution most clearly illustrates the ways in which black bodies came to be treated as commodities on the basis of methodically constructed difference. The perception was that blackness is universally subordinate to whiteness. Yet it obscured the fact that black men and women occupied different positions within slave economies on account of gender. As a result of the distinction, women endured greater sexual violence than men. They were forced to bear children, serve as wet nurses, endure sexual assault and bondage, and suffer other horrors. Understanding the oppressive systems navigated by black people requires imagining resistance to whiteness as resistance to kyriarchy, an order predicated on interlinked modes of domination and submission. It requires recognition of the fact that black marginality stems from notions of black bodies as labor and capital. Though black men and women were both, only the bodies of cisgender women could produce new labor and capital. And they were valued for this ability. The legacy of this particularly notable form of commodification endures to the present day: black trans women are valued less because, among other reasons, they fail to adhere to essentialist conceptions of black womanhood. Of this, both white hegemony and reactionary cisnormative, queerphobic black patriarchy are guilty. A similar attitude affects queer black women; their non-normative desires and expressions, when articulated, fail to conform to particular gazes, and they are punished and corrected accordingly. Though slave masters of the past objectified and violated black women, many present-day reactionary black patriarchs are keeping a spirit of that violence alive by romanticizing the ideal of the black “womb-man” whose sole function and duty is to mother new members of the race. For this reason alone, a masculinist politics that aspires to becoming the equivalent of an overthrown white male domination and whose fragility destroys cis and trans womanhood is as unrealistic a means of black women’s liberation as any attempt by black women to achieve equity with white women. A sexual politics that contests essentialist characterizations of bodies is necessary to liberate cis heterosexual women, cis queer women, transgender women of all sexualities, nonbinary individuals, and all possible combinations of black gender and sexuality. Salvation lies in a black liberation politics organized around a conception of blackness that displaces cisgender heterosexual masculinity and places queer, transgender, disabled, poor, and other marginal black identities at the center. It promises to free men from the violent and hegemonic masculinities they have internalized as the most valid. It promises to inspire a collective vision of blackness free of white sexual and gender norms, one that unleashes the vibrant and dynamic potential that has always existed but has always been violently suppressed from outside of the community and policed from within. It will be a participatory, ever-evolving labor of love that will never demand a surprise alteration.